Drew Freyman wrote:
> It seems you [Davies] still doubt whether profit motivates (I think you
said Drucker
> postulated fear of loss was the greater motivator).
Do I really sound so much like Dave Davies that you'd think that was him,
not me? Please say no, I really need cheering up today.
> However, when it comes
> to economic sustainability of new enterprises (as opposed to old
monopolies
> and oligopolies) and more importantly their ability to grow larger, profit
> is essential to allow future investment.
In normal times, profit (or solid evidence of the ability to make profit) is
essential for *attracting* investment. In a competitive market, however,
profit isn't nearly enough to be a major source of investment in itself, for
the corporation producing the earnings.
Canon, for example, as a matter of policy, plows 10% of its revenue into
R&D, regardless of whether it makes a profit or not. Canon's doing well in
these troubled times -- it shouldn't have trouble attracting investment with
its solid balance sheet and rapidly widening patent portfolio. Even if it
loses money this year. It could never, in a million years, fund its R&D out
of profits.
A Canon that cut R&D to the bone and reported the savings as profit would
attract little investment, since it would simply bleed to death in about a
decade (reporting handsome profits right up to the pronouncement of death.)
> I think this is what iMode was
> supposed to be all about: enabling new businesses and Japanese leadership
> to be exported to the world...
Bzzt. Sorry. "Fear of loss motive" again. iMode was a gamble to see if
DoCoMo could preserve the value of its investment in PDC while other
wireless players entered with newer, more cost-effective mobile voice
switching technology. A sudden gaiatsu-forced de-regulation of mobile
telecoms had competition suddenly breathing down NTT's neck.
They had to choose whether to (1) go for market share at the expense of
immediate revenues, or (2) try to guard a dwindling source of revenues, or
(3) spend a huge amount of money on new infrastructure.
They chose (1). And i-mode was a critical part of that strategy.
If this, as it seems now, ultimately meant throwing the NEC's and Fujitsu's
to the wolves, so be it. After all, that's just .... *electronics*. NTT is
the *phone company* -- the vehicle for the careers of all those Todai and
Waseda grads who signed on when NTT was the #1 choice of employers. The
ultimate amakudari destination. Still virtually (if not on paper) majority
owned by the Japanese government.
But not more powerful, ultimately, than international pressure to open
telecom markets:
http://199.88.185.106/tcc/data/commerce_html/TCC_Documents/JapanCellularImpl
ementation.html
[snip]
> This brings us back to cMode, which would seem like a great example. It
> keeps a lot of people busy. I am sure alot of money was spent to keep the
> various players happy. However, in the end of the day, the system does
not
> reduce costs nor increase productivity.
"System"? What "system"? All I see is a technology prototype, a proof of
concept.
Ken Olsen, late founder of the late DEC, is famously quoted as saying that
there was no use of computers in the home.
Around the same time, Alan Kay, who had already been part of inventing the
kinds of computers we now see in homes everywhere, was already saying ..."we
got to start thinking of computers as something that you can wear." Which
is what we're doing with these iAppli phones, it seems.
Ken Olsen was, of course, was looking at an RSTS-11 command line prompt, and
not applying his imagination.
Applying imagination was Alan Kay's *job*.
Xerox could have been Apple, and DEC could have been IBM (or at least
Compaq), but for a simple failure of imagination.
[snip]
-michael turner
leap@gol.com
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Received on Wed Sep 19 06:57:20 2001